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CONCERN ABOUT VARIATION IN




Criminologists, policymakers, and the public have been very con-
cerned about variation in criminal sentences during the last ten years.
Whether arguing on grounds of fairness, leniency, severity, or justice,
few people seem to be without opinions on the causes of, or solutions to,
unwarranted disparity in criminal sentencing.' While states are scram-
bling to implement their own favorite remedies, it is interesting to know
that the problem has been with us for quite some time. In fact, the
search for "solutions" to the disparity problem has probably existed for
as long as sentence lengths have been dependent upon judicial
discretion.
2
This Article traces the history of dissatisfaction with disparity3 in
* Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Niagara Univer-
sity. Ph.D., Rutgers University, 1981; M.A., Rutgers University, 1976; B.A. Niagara Univer-
sity, 1974. I am indebted to several colleagues and friends who provided both intellectual
support and relief during the preparation of this manuscript. Richard F. Sparks, Bridget A.
Stecher, Peggy L. Shelly, Julia Mueller, Carol Kenney, and Wilbur each played a role in its
completion, although they might not agree with all of my conclusions. I am also indebted to
a place, the luxurious Eliot Hotel, for providing a paranormal backdrop for some of this
research. Most of the research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National
Institute of Justice and was conducted at Rutgers University Criminal Justice Research
Center in Newark, New Jersey. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the
Institute or the Research Center.
1 See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrHOUT ORDER (1973); W.
GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974); N. MORRIS, THE Fu-
TURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DIs-
PARITY (M. Forest ed. 1982); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
2 See C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (H. Paolucci trans. 1963); C. SILBER-
MAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 285 (1980); Judicial Discretion, 11 CENT. L.J.
504 (1880); Kaufman, Judicial Discretion, 17 AM. L. REv. 546 (1883); Osborne, The Establish-
ment of Uniformity in Determning Punishments in Different Courts and DifferentJurisdictions, 7 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 804 (1917).
3 It should be noted that the term "disparity" pervades the sentencing literature and is
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sentencing during the first half of this century, as that dissatisfaction was
manifested by a number of attempts to demonstrate empirically the
existence of disparity and proposals to eliminate it. In addition, this
Article notes how the same concerns have arisen twice during the last
hundred years, resulting, during the 1940's, in the indeterminate sen-
tencing system and, during the late 1970's and early 1980's, in wide-
spread adoption of determinate sentencing.
II. EARLY EMPIRICAL EFFORTS
Although objections to the range of discretion exercised by judges
in sentencing were made much earlier,4 it was not until the early 1900's
that statistical evidence was compiled. In 1914, the Committee on
Criminal Courts of the New York City Magistrate's Courts reviewed
more than 155,000 cases disposed of in that year to determine the extent
that judges' reputations for severe or lenient sentencing were reflected in
-their dispositions of cases. The results showed a dramatic variation in
sentences given to apparently similar classes of cases.5
What was perhaps the earliest study containing a detailed statisti-
cal examination of sentencing variation was published in 1919.6 It ana-
lyzed sentencing data for the New York City Magistrate's Courts cases
of 1916. There were forty-two judges in the magistrate's courts at that
time who rotated at fifteen-day intervals among twenty-eight different
usually defined by a single phrase, such as "when like individuals, committing like offenses,
are treated differently." See W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 3; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at
29. Such a definition is misleading in its simplicity. Do differences in the sentencing provi-
sions of various state legal codes constitute disparity? Is it possible to separate legislatively
produced disparity from judicial disparity? To what degree should judges be expected to
sentence like offenders differently based upon community norms? These questions point to a
distinction that must be made between legitimate disparity and illegitimate disparity. Dis-
parity may have a legitimate role. Given two towns in the same state, one having one serious
crime per year and the other having one serious crime per hour, two similar offenders, com-
mitting similar offenses, could receive widely different sentences within the judge's legal range
of discretion (i.e., within the statutory minimum and maximum). Whether or not this consti-
tutes legitimate or illegitimate disparity entirely depends upon: (1) whether regional interpre-
tations of offense severity are legitimate, and (2) whether the statutory minimum and
maximum provide an acceptable range within which a judge can exercise his discretion (i.e.,
not too wide or too narrow). This is a political, rather than empirical, issue and it will not be
discussed further here. The remainder of this Article assumes "unwarranted disparity," how-
ever defined, when referring to disparity in criminal sentences.
4 For instance, Cesare Beccaria, writing in 1764, maintained that judges cannot deter-
mine punishment for another member of society because they do not have authority of legis-
lators: "Only the laws can decree punishments for crimes; authority for this can reside only
with the legislator who represents the entire society united by a social contract." C. BEC-
CARIA, supra note 2, at 13.
5 COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL COURTS, NEW YORK CITY MAGISTRATE'S COURT AN-
NUAL REPORT (1914).
6 Everson, The Human Element injustice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90
(1919).
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courts. This resulted in each magistrate presiding over a majority of the
courts at one time or another during a given year. The study pointed
out that under this rotation system "it can reasonably be assumed that
each magistrate handles practically the same classes of cases as those
handled by his colleagues."' 7 This study found wide disparity in the sen-
tencing practices of different judges. For peddling without a license, one
judge levied fines in all of his cases, while another levied fines in only ten
percent of his and gave suspended sentences in the remainder. For dis-
orderly conduct, one judge gave suspended sentences in just over two
percent of his cases, and another gave suspended sentences in fifty per-
cent of his cases. One judge gave workhouse sentences in eighty percent
of his vagrancy cases, while another gave such sentences in only seven-
teen percent of his cases.8
The author of that study saw these variations in sentences as
unalarming: "The magistrates are not to be condemned for this varia-
tion. . . . It is assumed that each magistrate is doing his duty as he sees
it and is rendering his best service in disposing of cases brought before
him."9 It is important to note that at the time of this study a city magis-
trate disposed of from fifty to 100 cases daily. 10 Thus, "he must get the
facts quickly and decide quickly."'1 1 This circumstance alone could lead
to arbitrary sentencing simply because of the lack of information neces-
sary to make a reasoned decision.' 2 In addition, prior to 1914, a magis-
trate was not able to compare his work with that of his colleagues and,
therefore, "his personal peculiarities were inclined to become accentu-
ated." 3 Although an important step, these revelations were but a dis-
tant precursor of contemporary sentencing reform.
In 1933, Gaudet, Harris and St. John conducted an important
study of individual differences in sentencing tendencies among judges. 14
From the records of one county in New Jersey, they selected 7,442 cases
covering a period of nine years and a total of twenty-one different of-
fenses.' 5 Sixjudges, who rotated among jurisdictions and were likely to
7 Id. at 91.
8 Id. at 97.
9 Id. at 98.
10 Id.
"I d.
12 There is evidence that burdensome court caseloads have forced this high turnover to
continue today. See W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 77; C. SILBERMAN, supra note 2, at 256.
13 Everson, supra note 6, at 98.
14 Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Di7erences in the Sentencing Tendencies ofjudges, 23 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
15 The crimes were chosen because of their relatively high frequency. The crimes used
were: larceny; larcency and robbery; breaking, entering, and receiving; breaking and enter-
ing; robbery; embezzlement; burglary; assault; assault and battery; battery and robbery; lar-
ceny from the person; assault and battery with intent to rob; violations of the Hobart Act
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receive a similar mix of cases, were involved.
The study revealed a significant range in sentencing tendencies
among the judges. The percentages of each judge's cases resulting in
imprisonment ranged from thirty-four percent to fifty-eight percent; the
imposition of suspended sentences ranged from sixteen percent to thirty-
four percent.16 A secondary analysis conducted for the purposes of this
Article confirms that the differences in incarceration rates among the
judges are statistically significant.
1 7
In 1940, the Newark Evening News conducted a study of sentence
lengths in the Essex County (New Jersey) Court of Common Pleas.' 8
The analysis included 4,029 sentences of dult males imposed by four
judges during three separate years.' 9 The results of this study indicate
that, taking all cases as a group, there were "considerable differences" in
the types of sentences imposed by the judges.2 0 For example, the fre-
quency of use of probation by each judge ranged from 29.6 to 40.5 per-
cent; and commitments to the county jail were imposed 2.2 to 11.9
percent of the time, depending upon which judge imposed sentence.
2 '
On the other hand, a second analysis, separating those defendants
facing multiple charges from those having only one charge against
them, showed "no striking differences" between the two judges com-
pared.2 2 The study also compared these two judges in an analysis of
their sentences for seven separate offenses. This comparison found that
the relative frequencies of different types of punishment selected by the
two judges for all of the seven offense categories were "not too
(New Jersey's prohibition law); adultery; rape; battery and rape; assault and battery with
intent to rape; abuse; carnal abuse; and assault and battery with intent to abuse.
16 Gaudet, Harris & St. John, supra note 14, at 815. The study also found that the general
sentencing tendencies of the judges did not greatly increase or decrease as they gained experi-
ence on the bench and that pending reappointments had no marked effect on the overall
severity or leniency of sentences. Accordingly, the authors concluded that the past environ-
ment and heredity of the judge must be the factors that influence the severity of sentencing.
Id. at 815-17.
17 X = 355.1, d.f. = 15, p .001. A reanalysis of Gaudet's finding that experience on the
bench made no difference in judicial sentencing tendencies, however, shows that the data
does not support his result. See supra note 16. The original study did not include tests for
statistical significance, thereby permitting disparate results upon subsequent analysis (X =
292.24, d.f. =4, p .0001). These findings negate Gaudet's explanation of the possible reasons
for the existence of sentencing variation, but they do confirm the existence of variation to a
significant degree.
18 Frankel, The Offender and the Court: A Statistical Analysis of the Sentencing of Delinquents, 31
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 448 (1940).
19 The three years were 1932, 1935, and 1939.
20 Frankel, supra note 18, at 451.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 454. Only two judges were compared because they were the only ones "having a





The authors did not test these latter comparisons for statistical sig-
nificance, however. A secondary analysis, done as part of the research
for this Article, shows that, for all seven offenses combined, there was a
significant difference between the sentences chosen by each of the two
judges.24 The findings of this study, then, are in accord with those pre-
ceding it: there appears to have been significant variation among judges
and jurisdictions even when sentencing similar types of cases.
These findings obtained additional support during this period from
the federal government. The 1939 annual report of the United States
Attorney General stated:
My studies of the disposition of criminal cases in the Federal courts
have led me to the conclusion that there frequently occur wide disparities
and great inequalities in sentence imposed in different districts, and even
by different judges in the same district, for identical offenses involving sim-
ilar states of facts.
25
In addition, the Committee on Sentencing, Probation, Prisons, and Pa-
role of the American Bar Association also issued a report in 1939 discuss-
ing the findings of a United States Department of Justice nationwide
study of the sentencing practices of federal judges. The report stated:
"The sentencing records of many judges, as well as the judges' own
statements concerning their sentencing practices, shows the presence of
arbitrary variance and numerous highly subjective factors and personal
biases in the imposing of sentence.1
2 6
III. REFORM OF THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE
An important step in the evolution of sentencing reform occurred
in Italy on September 14, 1919, when the Italian Minister of Justice
nominated the Commission for the Reform of the Italian Penal Code.
Enrico Ferri was named president of the Commission. Although the
Commission originally included representatives from all the various
"schools" of criminological thought, there were a number of resigna-
tions, and the final product-a proposed new Italian penal code-re-
flected Ferri's strong positivistic orientation. 2 7 Ferri believed that the
primary focus in sentencing should be on the personal and social back-
23 Id. at 454.
24 X = 293, d.f. = 3, p .001.
25 Holtzoff, The Indeterminate Sentence- Its Social and Legal Implications, 5 FED. PROBATION 3
(1941).
26 Morse, Report of the Committee on Sentencing, Probation, Prisons, and Parole, 1939 A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. L. REP. 37, 38.
27 E. FERRI, REPORT AND PRELIMINARY PROJECT FOR AN ITALIAN PENAL CODE (E.
Betts trans. 1921). The new code was completed in 1921 but was never implemented by the
Italian Parliament because of the post-World War I unrest that led to the Fascist revolution.
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ground of the offender, rather than on the nature of the crime commit-
ted. That the new code would have this orientation was clear as early as
Ferri's speech at the Commission's inauguration: "We shall try to bring
the fulcrum of the law from the crime to the criminal.
'28
Ferri felt that individualization of sentences by courts was not pos-
sible because judges could not make detailed studies of every offender.
Accordingly, Ferri felt judges should have enough information to place
the offender in the proper class, and then assign a sanction appropriate
to that class.29 For those incarcerated for indeterminate sentences, Ferri
thought future revisions of the sentence would be the task of "perma-
nent committees in which judges, prosecutors, defenders . . . and with
them psychiatrists and anthropologists would examine periodically
those committed, with the guarantee of publicity, to determine if the
term should be prolonged or not."
'30
The sentencing provisions in the revised Italian Penal Code empha-
sized "the principle of the dangerousness of the offender" as the funda-
mental criterion.3 1 This emphasis manifested itself in an elaborate
guideline structure consisting of a list of circumstances that indicated
greater or lesser dangerousness of the offender.3 2 The judges were to use
28 Ferri, The Nomination of a Commission for the Positivist Reform of the Italian Penal Code, 11 J.
AM. INST. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 75 (1920).
29 E. FERRI, supra note 27, at ch. III. Ferri identified five classes of offender types: the
born or instinctive criminal, the insane criminal, the passional criminal, the occasional crimi-
nal, and the habitual criminal.
30 Sellin, Pioneers in Criminology XV-Enrico Feni (1856-1929), 48 J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE Sci. 481, 492 (1958) (citing II Congresso d'Antropologia Ciminale a Ginevra, in LA
ScuoLA PosrrIvA (Sept. 1896), reprinted in STUDI SULLA CRIMINALrTA ED ATrRI SAGGI 216,
229 (1901)).
31 E. FERRI, supra note 27, at 485.
32 Id. at ch. III, art. 21.
Circumstances which indicate a greater dangerousness in the offender:
(1) Dissoluteness or dishonesty of prior personal, family or social life;
(2) Prior judicial and penal record;
(3) Abnormal organic and mental conditions before, during and after the offense, which
do not constitute mental infirmity and which reveal criminal tendencies;
(4) Precocity in committing a grave offense;
(5) Having acted through ignoble or trivial motives;
(6) Family and social relationship with the injured or damaged party;
(7) Deliberate preparation of the offense;
(8) Time, place, instruments, manner of execution, when these have rendered more diffi-
cult the defence by the injured or damaged party or indicate a greater moral insensibility
in the offender;
(9) The execution of the offense by means of ambush or strategem or through the com-
mission of other offenses or by abusing the aids of minors, the deficient, the unsound of
mind, the alcoholic, or by employing the assistance of other offenders;
(10) The execution of the offense during a public or private calamity or common danger;
(11) Abuse of trust in public or private matters or malicious violation of special duties;
(12) Execution of the offense on things confided to the public good faith or kept in public
offices or destined for public utility, defence, or reverence;
(13) Abuse of personal conditions of inferiority in the injured party or of circumstances
unfavorable to him;
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the guidelines in establishing the length and type of sentence.
When the guidelines indicating "conditions of dangerousness" are
scrutinized, however, the arbitrariness of Ferri's system becomes appar-
ent. Almost any situation would invoke a number of different "circum-
stances," each indicating a different level of "dangerousness." When
this happened, the judge was supposed to "establish which [circum-
stances] are prevalent, in order to graduate the dangerousness of the
accused and apply. . the sanction best adopted to his personality.
' 33
This, however, simply asked the judge to rely on the same sort of un-
guided individual discretion to which Ferri objected. Moreover, Ferri's
proposed code would have placed judges in the unenviable position of
making scientific judgments about matters that are not necessarily sub-
ject to scientific assessment. For example, Ferri placed a great deal of
credence in the unproven ability to accurately assess such "conditions of
dangerousness," as the "abnormal organic or mental conditions . . .
which do not constitute mental infirmity and which reveal criminal
tendencies.
'3 4
These faults notwithstanding, the revised Italian Penal Code was a
pioneering attempt to elucidate a more specific sentencing system; many
of Ferri's "circumstances of dangerousness" have been incorporated into
American penal law as degrees of offenses or aggravation/mitigation.
(14) Having aggravated the consequences of the offense or having through the same act
and not by mere accident damaged or injured more than one person, or having through
one and the same crime violated various provisions of law, or the same provision of law
at various times, by acts carrying out one and the same resolve;
(15) Blameworthy conduct after the offense towards the injured or damaged party or his
relations, the person present at the time of the offense;
(16) In offenses by imprudence (negligency) having caused the damage in circumstances
which made it very probable and easy to foresee.
[The following circumstances indicate] less dangerousness in the offender:
(1) Honesty or prior personal, family and social life;
(2) Having acted from excusable motives of public interest;
(3) Having acted in a state of excusable passion or of emotion through intense grief or
favor or impulse of anger unjustly provoked by others;
(4) Having yielded to a special and transitory opportunity or to exceptional and excusa-
ble personal or family conditions;
(5) Having acted in a state of drunkenness or other form of intoxication not to be fore-
seen by the offender, through transitory conditions of health or through unknown mate-
rial circumstances;
(6) Having acted through suggestion coming from a turbulent crowd;
(7) Having used, spontaneously and immediately after having committed the offense, all
exertion to diminish the consequences or to make good the damage, even in part, if it be
done with sacrifice of one's own economic condition;
(8) Having in repentance confessed the offense not yet discovered or before being interro-
gated by the judge, immediately after the offense.
Id.
33 E. FERRI, supra note 27, at 546.
34 Id. at ch. III, art. 21.
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IV. GLUECK'S "RATIONAL PENAL CODE"
In 1928, Sheldon Glueck published "Principles of a Rational Penal
Code, ' 35 which put forth his conception of the proper orientation and
structure of a penal code. Like Ferri, Glueck felt that the emphasis in
sentencing should be on the offender, rather than on the crime. He
called for treatment of the offender's shortcomings rather than punish-
ment based solely upon the offense committed.36 Glueck pointed out
that the then-existing trend toward indeterminate sentences, in practice,
had little effect on the traditional "mass-treatment" method of dealing
with offenders, which focused on the crimes committed rather than on
the offenders themselves.
37
Glueck went on to criticize accepted sentencing practices that were
based on legislative prescription of penalties for various offenses: "Legis-
lative prescription of detailed degrees of offenses is individualization of
acts and not of human beings, and is, therefore, bound to be ineffi-
cient."'3 8 He maintained, however, that judicial individualization of of-
fenders without "scientific facilities in aid of the court" is destined to
"deteriorate into a mechanical process of application of certain rules of
thumb or of implied or expressed prejudices. '39 Glueck's view repre-
sented an important move toward a more flexible sentencing approach
inasmuch as he recognized that pre-existing sentencing guidelines can
never anticipate the diversity of human circumstances, and that there
must be a more scientific method for determining sentence lengths than
mere application of arbitrary legislative rules.
Glueck also devoted much of his paper to a critique of Ferri's Ital-
ian Penal Code. In addition to criticizing the code's arbitrariness in se-
lecting sentence lengths and types based upon preconceived conditions,
Glueck felt that Ferri's one-dimensional emphasis on the dangerousness
of the offender was both "unjust and unscientific" and "under-
emphasize[d] the rehabilitative possibilities of the offender." 40 He
pointed out that Ferri's criteria for what is dangerousness and less dan-
gerousness permanently label the offender prior to any treatment he
may receive. This forces the judge to sentence speculatively, a task bet-
ter carried out by parole boards.
Glueck recommended the establishment of a "Socio-Penal Com-
mission" (or "treatment board"), made up of social scientists, that
would determine the type of treatment and duration best suited to each
35 Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1928).
36 Id. at 465.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 467.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 469.
1984]
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individual offender.4 1 Such a board, in Glueck's view, would provide a
more truly indeterminate sentence in which the correctional process
would be expressly aimed at the offender rather than the act. However,
Glueck did not discuss the specific means by which this "treatment
board" would decide on the proper sentence. Thus, in 1928, except for
his references to the need for new and improved treatment methods,
precisely what his alternative might be to the existing judicial discretion
guided by legislative rules was unclear.
V. PERSPECTIVES OF SENTENCING CONCERN
The growing interest in sentencing reform during the 1930's and
1940's 42 emanated from two perspectives. The first was increasing con-
cern about sentence variation itself Studies appeared that, for the first
time, statistically documented the existence of wide sentence variation
among judges and jurisdictions. 43 The second perspective, expressed by
Ferri and Glueck, saw the need for sentence reform because of dissatis-
faction with legislative rules that did not account for the treatment po-
tential of offenders.
44
Both perspectives are closely linked to the then-existing trend to-
ward indeterminate sentencing throughout the country. By 1941, ap-
proximately three-fourths of the states were operating indeterminate
sentencing systems in one form or another,45 and the Conference of Se-
nior Circuit Judges had adopted a resolution favoring the adoption of
an indeterminate sentencing law for the federal courts.46 Among the
arguments for a change to indeterminacy at the federal level was that
the existence of an administrative board (parole board) to determine the
actual period of imprisonment within the minimum and maximum set
by the court would serve to make penalties more uniform: "The conse-
quence necessarily emerges from the fact that a single board, or perhaps
several boards, acting in close cooperation, determine the length of in-
carceration to which every prisoner would be subjected. In other words,
all cases clear through the same channel.
'4 7
41 Id. at 476.
42 See Glueck, supra note 35; Holtzoff, supra note 25; Morse, supra note 26.
43 See Everson, supra note 6; Frankel, supra note 18; Gaudet, Harris & St. John, supra note
14; Holtzoff, supra note 25. The basis for this concern was fairness to offenders.
44 See Ferri, supra note 28 and accompanying text; Glueck, supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text; Sellin, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45 Holtzoff, supra note 25, at 5.
46 Id. Indeterminate sentencing schemes allowed for the actual length of an offender's
confinement to be determined by a parole board, usually quite some time after he began
serving the sentence, rather than a more specific sentence set by a judge that characterizes
determinate sentencing.
47 Holtzoff, supra note 25, at 5.
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Commentators also thought that this board would take the guess-
work out of sentencing by reducing "arbitrary variance in the treatment
of prisoners possessing similar case histories. '4 8 The parole board would
make its judgments based on the offender's treatment potential and his
rehabilitation while incarcerated. Thus, indeterminate sentencing was
considered both an answer to wide sentencing variations and a recogni-
tion of the individualized treatment needs of each offender.
49
VI. THE CYCLICAL CONCERN FOR SENTENCING REFORM
The arguments used in support of indeterminacy are interesting for
a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that these same
arguments have been widely used during the 1970's and 1980's in sup-
port of determinate sentencing. In the 1950's and 1960's, questions be-
gan to emerge about whether the new sentencing system was achieving
its goals,5 0 much in the same way that questions arose about the old
system in the 1930's and 1940's. The first question related to the ability
of indeterminate sentencing to reduce wide variations in sentences. This
provoked the development of a number of methods to reduce this varia-
tion, such as sentencing institutes, appellate review, sentencing councils,
and sentencing guidelines5 '-none of which enjoyed a great deal of
success.
5 2
The ultimate result has been a nationwide trend back toward deter-
minacy. Between 1976 and 1982, forty-three states passed mandatory
48 Morse, Kennedy & Ellis, Comments on the FederalIndeterminate Sentence Bill, 5 FED. PROBA-
TION 23 (1941).
49 Id. at 22-42. It should be noted, however, that of the academics, federal judges, and
criminal justice officials who commented favorably on the bill in 1941, most saw indetermi-
nacy primarily as a means of reducing disparity in sentences, rather than as a method of
individualized treatment. Id.
50 See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE AssOcIATION, GuIDES FOR SENTENCING
(1957); DeCosta, Disparity and Inequality of Criminal Sentences: Constitutional and Legislative Ap-
proaches to Appellate Review and Reallocation of the Sentencing Function, 14 How. L.J. 29 (1968);
Doyle, A Sentencing Council in Operation, 25 FED. PROBATION 27 (1961); Remington & New-
man, The Highland Park Institute on Sentence Disparity, 26 FED. PROBATION 3 (1962); Sharp, The
Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 23 FED. PROBATION 9 (1959); Comment, Criminal Procedure, Appeala-
bility of a Criminal Sentence--Sentence Modiftd on Appeal, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 186 (1961).
51 See supra note 50 and sources cited therein.
52 For reviews of the effectiveness of sentencing councils, see Hosner, Group Procedures in
Sentencing: A Decade of Practice, 34 FED. PROBATION 18 (1970); Levin, Towarda More Enlightened
Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1966). For an analysis of appellate review, see
Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penolog at the Judicial Doorstep, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 122 (1977); Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YAE LEJ. 1453 (1960). For an assessment of sentencing guidelines, see R.
Sparks, B. Stecher, J. Albanese & P. Shelly, Stumbling Toward Justice: Some Overlooked
Research and Policy Questions about Statewide Sentencing Guidelines (March 31, 1982) (un-
published manuscript). For a general review, see von Hirsch & Albanese, Problems with Abol-
ishing Parole Release: The New York Case, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 416 (1979).
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sentencing laws for certain crimes and nine states adopted determinate
sentencing systems. 53 Although these changes were attributable, in part,
to dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative ideal, 54 they were primarily due
to the lack of success of the many methods introduced to curb unwar-
ranted variation in sentences. 55 This concern about variation in
sentences is precisely the same as that expressed in the 1930's and 1940's
with respect to determinate sentencing. In both instances, existing sen-
tencing practice was criticized for its lack of uniformity and unfairness
to offenders. For example, in 1941 George Vold argued in support of
indeterminacy that "[t]he essential purpose of providing protection for
society against the criminal is in fact facilitated by the generally greater
consistency in operation of a single agency as compared with the variety
of conflicting views represented in sentences imposed by a number of
individual judges."'56 In comparison, Andrew von Hirsch, arguing for
determinate sentencing in 1976, stated: "The most obvious drawback of
allowing wide-open discretion in the name of 'individualization' is the
disparity it permits. Judges whose sentencing decisions are unchecked
by general standards are free to decide similar cases differently.
'5 7
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the recent debate concerning determinate and indetermi-
nate sentencing has focused on philosophies of sentencing: rehabilita-
tion, desert, incapacitation, and deterrence. A review of the history of
the determinate/indeterminate debate, however, shows that the advo-
53 J. CALVIN, SETTING PRISON TERMS (1983); von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penally
Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289 (1981).
54 In other words, these changes were attributable in part to the failure of the correctional
system to rehabilitate offenders and to know when or how an individual might be rehabili-
tated. See supra note 1. Much of the recent sentencing debate has focused on what the pur-
poses of sentencing should be, if not rehabilitation: desert, see von Hirsch, Desert and Previous
Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591 (1981); incapacitation, see P. GREENWOOD &
A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); or deterrence, see van den Haag, Pnish-
ment as a Device for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706 (1981).
55 See supra note 52 and studies cited therein.
56 Morse, Kennedy & Ellis, supra note 48, at 39.
57 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 29 (footnote omitted). Compare Morse, Kennedy &
Ellis, supra note 48, at 28, 41 with M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 39-52 and W. GAYLIN, supra
note 1, at 165. Although determinate and mandatory sentences ignore some lessons of history
in producing massive increases in prison populations but decreases in arrests, indictments,
and convictions, disillusionment with sentence disparity and rehabilitation appears to carry a
stronger message than does the historical record. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPE-
RIENCE (1977); Gatz & Vito, The Use of the Determinate Sentence-An Historical Perspective.- A
Research Note, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 323 (1982); Petersilia & Greenwood, Mandatoy Prison Sentences:
Their Projected EFects on Crime and Prison Populations, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604
(1978); Rossman, Froyd, Pierce, McDevit & Bowers, Massachusetts Mandatory Minimum Gun
Law.- Enforcement, Prosecution, and Defense Impact, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 150 (1980).
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cates of both methods share a common interest in eliminating unwar-
ranted disparity. Viewed in this way, changing philosophies of
sentencing may simply be a reflection of the most recent trend in our
cyclical concern about variation in criminal sentences.
